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Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in ASEAN – 





The ASEAN landscape on trade and investment dispute mechanisms has been changing significantly 
over the last 15 years. Such changes have come about partly due to preparations for establishment of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. An example is the coming into force on 29 
March 2012 of the landmark ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), a region-wide 
treaty in which ASEAN member States have committed to a number of significant investment 
obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms. Other developments have arisen from the signing of 
trade and investment agreements between ASEAN and its major trade partners, namely, Australia, 
New Zealand, China, India, Japan and Korea. With these same partners, ASEAN is presently 
negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). At the same 
time, some ASEAN member States are negotiating parties for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP). 
This paper will provide an overview of the trade and investment dispute settlement systems of 
ASEAN. It will introduce the mechanism established to handle trade disputes under the Protocol on 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the investment dispute settlement mechanisms under the 
ACIA, and the options in the trade and investment agreements signed by ASEAN and its major 
trade partners. Finally, it will highlight some recent investment disputes in the region as well as 
broader investor-State dispute challenges faced by ASEAN member states. 
                                                          
 Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University, Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore Bar), 




I. Introduction – ASEAN trade and investment treaty-making 1992-2014 
 
While ASEAN, with its various economic promotion activities, has existed since 1967, the year 
1992 represents a seminal point in its history as it marked the launch of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA).With this launch, ASEAN embarked on the introduction of the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) system so that ASEAN members would increasingly apply 
common tariffs to each other’s goods. Concomitantly, ASEAN moved to progressively reduce 
barriers in the areas of trade in services and in investments. In 2007, ASEAN members agreed 
upon the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 1  as an economic plan for the route to 
further economic integration and the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
The AEC is expected to be launched by the end of 2015, with ASEAN forming a single market 
and production base. 
 
ASEAN legal historians will no doubt observe that over the years, there has been a concerted 
move towards a greater use of formal legal rules in ASEAN norm-setting and governance 
structures. While these are by no means the first documents promoting economic integration, 
the 1992 legal agreements forming the AFTA and CEPT certainly advanced economic treaty- 
and rule-making in the region. In the area of dispute settlement, ASEAN members have adopted 
a formal, rules-based dispute settlement system modeled after the World Trade Organization’s 
system, to address intra-ASEAN economic disputes.2 In a number of other significant legal 
instruments, ASEAN members have expressly referred to adoption of a “rules-based” approach 
in governing its economic relations.3 
 
In 2012, there was another legal watershed, with the coming into effect of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). This superseded two prior investment 
agreements and is, as its name suggests, intended to be more comprehensive, both in its 
substantive scope and in its dispute settlement arrangements. 
 
In recent years, ASEAN has also entered into a number of significant trade and investment 
agreements with major partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, China, Korea, India and 
Japan. These agreements contain their own dispute settlement structures. All ASEAN members 
are also parties to the WTO dispute settlement process,with some having acted as complainants 
                                                          
1 13thASEAN Summit, 20 November 2007; for the text of the Blueprint and associated documents, see 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/thirteenth-asean-summit-singapore-18-22-november-2007. The ASEAN 
Charter, ASEAN’s formal constitutional document, was launched in 2007 as well. 
2 Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism 2004. 
3 See for example Art. 2(2)(n) of the ASEAN Charter, setting out the following as one of ASEAN’s “Principles”: 
“adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for effective implementation 
of economic commitments and progressive reduction towards elimination of all barriers to regional 
economic integration, in a market-driven economy.” 
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or respondents in WTO disputes. In recent years, several ASEAN countries have also been 
respondents in investor-State disputes. Some of these are discussed below. 
 
The increased use by ASEAN of binding legal instruments and exposure to dispute settlement 
obligations, as well as actual dispute experiences, have drawn attention to increased legal risks 
faced by members in the new and evolving legal landscape in the region. 
 
II. ASEAN Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
In the field of economic relations, ASEAN’s Protocol for Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism 2004 (EDSM) is the primary dispute settlement structure. The EDSM system in the 
2004 Protocol is a product arising from recommendations made by a High Level Task Force 
(HLTF) set up at the Ninth Summit of ASEAN leaders in Bali.4The EDSM bears several striking 
similarities to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) system. Common features 
include a panel procedure, an appeal mechanism known as the Appellate Body, as well as 
provisions allowing suspension of concessions (often referred to as retaliatory measures). The 
EDSM also contains a significant role for the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting 
(SEOM). In several respects the functions of SEOM resemble those of the Dispute Settlement 
Body under DSU.At the same time, the EDSM contains a number of important differences 
from the WTO’s DSU, such as in the area of timelines in the dispute settlement process. 
 
For investment-related disputes, the ACIA is a key regional instrument.5Apart from aiming to be 
comprehensive in scope of coverage, the ACIA sets out a number of important objectives and 
“guiding principles”, investor protection provisions such as guarantees with respect to treatment 
and expropriation, and dispute settlement structures. For disputes arising under the ACIA 
investors who qualify under its terms may bring investor-State arbitration to a number of 
possible options, including ICSID arbitration, 6  andad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules. 
 
ASEAN’s trade and investment agreements with its major partners also contain their own 
dispute settlement structures, including investor-State dispute mechanisms.7 
                                                          
4 The original iteration of the DSM was established in 1996 – a year after the coming into being of the WTO 
itself. See generally the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, 2003 (Bali Concord II), paragraph B3. The 
ASEAN Economic Blueprint of 2007 further emphasized the need to strengthen the DSM system. For the 
Task Forces’ recommendations, see http://www.aseansec.org/hltf.htm.  
5 The text of the ACIA is available at: http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-comprehensive-investment-
agreement-cha-am-thailand-26-february-2009. The ACIA supersedes two predecessor agreements, namely, the 
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (1998) and The ASEAN Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (1987). 
6 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (entered into force 14 
October 1966); seehttps://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/Overview.aspx.  
7 See for example the ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand FTA, and the Agreement on Investment of the 




Finally, a number of other developments merit mention. First, while investor-State arbitration 
has been made available to ASEAN investors through the treaties mentioned above, conciliation 
and mediation are also often available as well. For instance, Article 30 of the ACIA provides for 
disputing parties to agree to resort to conciliation at any time, while Article 30 allows disputing 
parties to make use of negotiations or other non-binding third-party procedures as well.  
 
Secondly, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, adopted in 
2014, are aimed at increasing transparency in investor-State arbitrations.8 They provide a new 
milestone for disputing investor-State parties using the UNCITRAL arbitration rules after 1 
April 2014. Unless the parties agree otherwise, these Rules will now apply to their arbitrations. 
For treaties – such as the ACIA, which contains UNCITRAL arbitration rules as one dispute 
settlement option9 – concluded before 1 April 2014, it is possible for parties to consent to the 
application of these new transparency rules as well. 
 
Thirdly, new structures within the ASEAN region which have recently been established to 
handle cross-border disputes may play useful roles in meeting the dispute settlement needs of 
ASEAN in its economic evolution. One such new structure that could be of interest to disputing 
parties is the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), established as a division of 
Singapore’s High Court (and is therefore a part of the Supreme Court) to hear international 
commercial disputes in  which the parties have submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction in 
writing.10Cases may be heard by a number of experienced Singapore and International Judges,11 
and the SICC’s decisions may be appealed to Singapore’s Court of Appeal. This latter feature 
differentiates it from international arbitration (where in many systems, appeals are either not 
permitted or very limited).12Users of the SICC may instruct foreign counsel to act on their behalf 
in certain types of cases. Another new structure which may also be of interest is the Singapore 
International Mediation Centre (SIMC), which was launched in late 2014.13  The SIMC is focuses 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China; texts are available at: 
http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_acfta.asp?hl=2.  
8 UNCITRAL website, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html. 
9 Under Article 33(1)(d). 
10 The SICC was launched on 5 January 2015. See generally, http://www.sicc.gov.sg/, and 
http://www.sicc.gov.sg/About.aspx?id=22, for these and other jurisdiction-related criteria. 
11 ElevenInternationalJudges have so far been appointed: see 
http://www.straitstimes.com/news/singapore/courts-crime/story/new-singapore-international-commercial-
court-launched-20150105 and http://www.sicc.gov.sg/Judges.aspx?id=30 
12
 See The Hon. The Chief Justice of Singapore, Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: 
Issues, Challenges and Possible Solutions (September 2014) Asian Journal of International Law 1(“The Transnational 
Protection of Private Rights”) at 17, where it was observed that in the context of investment arbitration, “[t]here is 
no avenue of appeal to help strip away some of the errors, incoherence, or inconsistencies in the arbitral 
jurisprudence”, and generally, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age 
for Asia (and Elsewhere), Opening Plenary Session at ICCA Congress 2012 (“International Arbitration: The Coming of 
a New Age for Asia (and Elsewhere)”), available online at:http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/13398435632250/ags_opening_speech_icca_congress_2012.pdf , at para 25. 
13 See http://simc.com.sg/.  
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on providing international mediation services, with experienced mediators from 14 countries 
serving on its panel. 
 
III. Trade Disputes 
 
The EDSM Protocol’s preamble refers to establishing “practical, effective and credible 
mechanisms” to resolve disputes, and to the “transformation” of ASEAN “into a rules-based 
organization”.14 It applies to disputes arising from agreements set out in its Annex I and “future 
ASEAN economic agreements”. The EDSM Protocol also provides as follows: 
“ARTICLE 1 
Coverage and Application 
 … 
3. The provisions of this Protocol are without prejudice to the rights of Member States 
to seek recourse to other fora for the settlement of disputes involving other Member 
States. A Member State involved in a dispute can resort to other fora at any stage before 
a party has made a request to the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (“SEOM”) to 
establish a panel pursuant to paragraph 1 Article 5 of this Protocol.” 
The WTO’s DSU system permits only disputes relating to the “covered agreements” of the 
WTO to be brought under it.15 The DSU does not envisage the use of alternative fora to resolve 
disputes pertaining to its “covered agreements”. 
 
Since establishment of the WTO and its DSU system in 1995, a large number of trade disputes 
have been brought to and settled in the system. As WTO members, ASEAN member states- 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand - have been active in this system for 
some time, some having initiated complaints while othershave acted as respondents. In addition, 
ASEAN countries have participated as third parties in numerous other WTO disputes. 16 As 
recently as in 2011, the Philippines and Thailand were involved in a WTO dispute over Thai 
fiscal and customs measures affecting cigarettes from the Philippines.17 
 
IV. Investment Disputes 
                                                          
14 A CEPT-related dispute arose in 2003 between Singapore and Philippines but was settled; see 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2003/07/11/502804/singapore-and-the-philippines-agree-to-settle-row.html.  
15 DSU, Art. 1.1. 
16 For information on WTO disputes by country, see generally: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm.  
17 See the panel and Appellate Body reports WTO/DS371/R and WTO/DS371/AB/R respectively, available in 
links at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/dsb_15jul11_e.htm. For a previous discussion of the 
application of WTO law in ASEAN disputes, see Hsu, Application of WTO in ASEAN, paper presented at the 
Workshop, ASEAN Laws in the 21st Century, of the8th General Assembly of the ASEAN Law Association, 




ASEAN member states are no newcomers to investment disputes. 
 
In the only reported investment arbitration under an ASEAN investment treaty so far, Yaung Chi 
Oo v Myanmar, an investor based in Singapore instituted arbitration proceedings under the (now-
superseded) 1987 ASEAN investment agreement against Myanmar for alleged violations of that 
treaty.18Myanmar argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Due to the 
tribunal’s interpretation of the scope and requirements of the Agreement, it agreed and ruled 
that it lacked jurisdiction. Hence, the case never proceeded beyond the jurisdictional challenge to 
a full hearing on the merits. 
 
The following are some recentexamples of ICSID and UNCITRAL cases that member States 
have been engaged in with investors of non-ASEAN nationality.19 
 
In recent years, countries in ASEAN – including its newer members such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam - have begun to experience investor claims being initiated under investment 
treaties. 
 
In Cambodia Power Company v Kingdom of CambodiaandElectricité du Cambodge, Cambodia faced a 
claim of US$300m brought by a US investor, which it successfully defended, with legal costs of 
over US$5m being awarded to Cambodia.20 
 
In Thai-Lao Lignite v Lao PDR, the claimants were a Thai entity which brought arbitration 
proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules against Lao PDR pursuant to the parties’ 
Project Development Agreement. This dispute took place against the backdrop of the Asian 
financial crisis. The tribunal, whose seat was in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, made an award in the 
arbitral seat (Malaysia) for a sum ofmore than US$57 million (including legal costs) against Lao 
PDR. Enforcement proceedings were brought by the claimant in the US, which succeeded. 
However, in the meantime, Lao PDR challenged the award in the Malaysian courts. In 2013, the 
Malaysian Court of Appeal confirmed a decision of its High Court to set aside the award.21 Lao 
                                                          
18 (2003) 42 ILM 540. A second argument was also raised in the case, based on provisions in the 1998 Framework 
Agreement. 
19 This is not an exhaustive list. 
20 ICSID Case No. ARB/09/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (22 March 2011), and Award (22 April 2013). The final 
Award, which appears not to have been published, found in favour of Cambodia in the US$300m claim by a 
US investor; see reports at http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/government-wins-plant-row and 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/arbitration-court-backs-government-in-power-deal-with-us-firm-
20675/. With respect to Vietnam, see T.T. Nguyen and T.C.Q. Vu,Vietnam Investor-State Dispute Settlement from 
the Perspective of Vietnam: Looking for a "Post-Honeymoon" Reform (Jan 2014) TDM 11:1. 




PDR therefore proceeded to petition to have the earlier US judgment vacated, and this action 
succeeded in February 2014.22 
 
In another investment-related dispute, a Macau-based business initiated ad hoc arbitration 
proceedings against Lao PDR in respect of certain investments made in the hospitality and 
casino sectors, in Sanum Investments Ltd v Lao PDR.23 The matter was recently brought to the 
Singapore High Court recently in order for the Court to determine the main issue of whether, in 
its arbitration claim, Sanum Investments Ltd could rely on the bilateral investment treaty signed 
between the People’s Republic of China and Lao PDR.24 The Singapore High Court found that 
Sanum Investments Ltd was not able to rely on this treaty as the evidence showed that the PRC 
did not intend to have it apply to Macau (over which the PRC “resumed sovereignty” and 
established as a special administration region in 1999). The evidence was found to have rebutted 
the international law position that such a treaty would normally apply to a country’s (PRC’s) 
territories. In so ruling, the Court departed from the view of the arbitral tribunal, which earlier 
found that the treaty could apply. 
 
Vietnam has faced at least four investor-State arbitration claims. One, brought under the 
Netherlands-Vietnam BIT, has been settled25  and another, brought by a US-based claimant, was 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with the arbitral tribunal ordering the claimant to bear not 
only the arbitration costs, but also Vietnam’s legal representation costs. 26  Another two 
arbitration claims, brought by French entities, appear to be pending at this time.27 
 
In Malaysian Historical SalvorsSdnBhd v Government of Malaysia, a UK-based investor initiated ICSID 
arbitration proceedings against Malaysia in respect of a contract to locate and salvage cargo of a 
British vessel which sank off the coast of Malacca in 1817. The Award on Jurisdiction was made 
in 2007 but this was subsequently annulled in 2009.28 
 
In Werner Schneider, acting in his capacity as insolvency administrator of Walter Bau Ag (In Liquidation) v. 
The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings were brought against the Kingdom 
of Thailand by a German party in relation to a Concession Agreement for construction of a 
tollway project. 29  Thailand objected on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that a certificate of 
                                                          
22 See http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1208 and 
http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=1665.  
23 See Notice of Arbitration dated 14 August 2012, available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3234.pdf.  
24 Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments Ltd[2015] SGHC15. 
25 Trinh VinhBinh v. Vietnam (settled),UNCITRAL Award, 2007. 
26 Michael L. McKenzie v Vietnam,  
27 RECOFI v Vietnam, UNCITRAL arbitration; see http://www.italaw.com/cases/2404 and Dialasie SAS v. 
Vietnam; see generally, Getting the Deal Through 2014, Vietnam, at http://dzungsrt.com/wp-
content/uploads/doc/A2014-Vietnam-Chapter.pdf.  
28 ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10; see ICSID website, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/05/10. 
29 See http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1515.  
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approval, which was required for investors to qualify for protection, had not been obtained by 
the investor. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of jurisdiction and in 2009,an Award was made 
in favour of the claimant, providing for compensation and interest of more than €30 million. 
Subsequently, enforcement proceedings arose in the US and Germany.30 
 
In FraportAG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines, 31  a German 
claimant initiated ICSID arbitration against the Philippines with respect to construction of an 
airport terminal. A 2007 award was subsequently annulled under the ICSID annulment process 
in 2010. In 2011, a fresh arbitral action was initiated by the claimant for a sum exceeding 
US$425m but in December 2014, the ICSID tribunal declined jurisdiction in this second 
arbitrationclaim by the investor.32 More recently, a Belgian claimant initiated ICSID arbitration 
against the Philippines for a project, and this claim remains pending at the time of writing.33 
 
Indonesia first experienced ICSID arbitration in the 1980s.34More recently, in Churchill Mining 
PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia,35UK and Australian investors have brought 
ICSID arbitration proceedings against Indonesia with respect to coal mining licenses, and this 
matter remains pending at the time of writing. Another claim that is pending is Rafat Ali Rizvi v 
Republic of Indonesia.36 
 
V. Some Relevant Issues in Investment Law 
 
                                                          
30 For a fuller account of the German enforcement proceedings, see Roland Kläger, Werner Schneider (liquidator of 
Walter Bau AG) v Kingdom of Thailand Sovereign Immunity in Recognition and Enforcement Proceedings under German Law, 
ICSID Review (2014), pp. 1–7, available at: 
http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/02/13/icsidreview.sit043.full.pdf+html. 
31 ICSID Case No.ARB/03/25; see ICSID website, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/03/25. Another 
ICSID arbitration faced by the Philippines is SGSSociétéGénérale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6. A separate ICC arbitration was also brought and this resulted in an award in 
favour of the Philippines in July 2010 (see related case brought by the claimant in an attempt to set aside this 
ICC award in the Singapore High Court, Government of the Republic of the Philippines v Philippine International Air 
Terminals Co, Inc 
[2007] 1 SLR(R) 278). A separate action is also pending before the Philippines Supreme Court; see Luke Eric 
Peterson, Arbitrators Dismiss Fraport’s Second Attempt to Hold the Philippines Liable for Breach of BIT in Airport Dispute, 
Investment Arbitration Reporter, 11 December 2014, and Fraport website, http://www.fraport.com/en/press-
center/reports---publications-/press-releases/icsid-again-negates-its-jurisdiction-for-arbitrating-fraports-
co.html.  
32 Fraport website, http://www.fraport.com/en/press-center/reports---publications-
/archive/2011/fraport_files_newrequestforarbitrationagainsttherepublicofthephi.html and   
33 See https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/11/27, and 
also generally, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/09/21/1371431/phl-abide-rulings-fraport-lake-
project. 
34 Amco Asia Corporation and Others v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.ARB/81/1. 
35 ICSID Case No.ARB/12/14 and 12/40; see ICSID website, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/12/40 and 12/14.  
36 ICSID Case No.ARB/11/13. 
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The steep rise in the number of investment disputes and certain recent lines of arbitral decisions 
have led to a great deal of literature discussing the merits and problems of investor-State 
arbitration.37Some countries have also expressed reservations as well as acted to address their 
concerns.38Some reasons for the disquiet are outlined below. 
 
First, there is ongoing discomfort over the fact that arbitral decisions in this field are not subject 
to a system of binding precedent. Observations have been made that this can lead – and arguably 
has led – to inconsistencies in the manner in which similar treaty provisions are interpreted and 
applied. While the practice of treaty interpretation requires each investment treaty to be 
interpreted according to its text and context,39 one may discern strongly differing threads of 
interpretative philosophy among tribunals in certain lines of arbitration “case law”. 40  This 
divergence of opinions in interpretation of particular types of investment provisions is of 
concern to treaty negotiators and treaty parties, for the reason of lack of certainty. 
 
In respect of minimum treatment guarantees for foreign investors, open-ended treaty language 
of provisions guaranteeing “fair and equitable” treatment have drawn different interpretations by 
tribunals, so much so that in its recent treaty negotiations, the EU has attempted to inject some 
certainty to the boundaries of such a provision.41The ACIA contains a “fair and equitable” 
treatment provision but members have decided to circumscribe its scope through the use of 
limiting treaty language.42 Some “ASEAN-plus” agreements (i.e. agreements signed by ASEAN 
                                                          
37 See Fig. 1, p. 2, UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note, No. 1, April 2014, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf. See also generally, eds. Michael Waibel, 
AshaKaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung, Claire BalchinTheBacklash Against International Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, 
Wolters Kluwer (2010). 
38 Indonesia, for example, announced recently that it would terminate its bilateral investment treaties, while India 
is planning to review its investment treaties; see 
http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/organization/departments/economic-affairs/termination-bilateral-investment-
treaty.html, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html and 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-05/news/38306801_1_investment-protection-bipas-
nation-treatment. 
39 See Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
40 An example is the well-known “line of cases” afterMaffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7. 
41 See EU Commission, fact sheet on EU-Singapore 
FTA,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152845.pdf and EU public consultation 
paper for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) with the US, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf.     
42 Art. 11 provides: 
 “1. Each Member State shall accord to coveredinvestments of investors of any other Member State, fair 
andequitable treatment and full protection and security. 
 2. For greater certainty: 
 (a) fair and equitable treatment requires eachMember State not to deny justice in any legal oradministrative 
proceedings in accordance withthe principle of due process; and 
 (b) full protection and security requires each MemberState to take such measures as may bereasonably necessary 
to ensure the protectionand security of the covered investments. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach ofanother provision of this Agreement, or of a 
separateinternational agreement, does not establish that there hasbeen a breach of this Article.” 
10 
 
with external partners) contain similar limiting language.43 The ACIA also contains important 
provisions on expropriation and limitations as to what may be considered “indirect 
expropriation”. 44  It also contains a General Exceptions provision covering several types of 
circumstances,45 which resembles Article XX (General Exceptions) of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) of the WTO. These provisions were undoubtedly included to 
preserve a degree of regulatory flexibility for ASEAN members in the face of the numerous legal 
obligations undertaken in the ACIA. 
 
Secondly, the size of compensation sums that may arise from an investor-State arbitration award 
can be staggering, particularly for a developing country. To take an extremeexample, in one 
arbitration against a (non-ASEAN) developing country (one of the largest awards granted in an 
ICSID arbitration)the compensation was US$1,769,625,000 (even after a 25% deduction for the 
investor’s own breach).46 The claims made against ASEAN member states in the arbitrations 
mentioned above have also been highly significant in size. 
 
Thirdly, as can be seen from some of the examples above, actions after an award has been 
rendered can also be expensive and time-consuming, such as where a losing state decides it has 
to challenge enforcement of an unfavorable award, particularly where it has to do this in more 
than one jurisdiction. 
 
Fourthly, some criticisms have beenraised over the selection of arbitrators and in relation to 
perceptions as to impartiality.47 
 
Finally, third-party funded arbitration is a rising concern.48 
 
For reasons such as those above, some states have taken action over the last several years to 
limit or better manage their investment dispute risks. For example, a small number of Latin 
American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have decided to denounce the 
                                                          
43 See for example the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand ASEAN-Korea, and ASEAN-China investment 
provisions. 
44 Art. 14 and Annex 2. 
45 Art. 17. Art. 18 further provides for Security Exceptions. 
46 Occidental Petroleum Corp. and Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v.The Republic of Ecuador , ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/11 Award (5 October 2012); award available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1094.pdf. 
47 See, for example, the discussions in chapters 9, 14 and 18 in eds. Michael Waibel, AshaKaushal, Kyo-Hwa 
Chung, Claire BalchinTheBacklash Against International Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, Wolters Kluwer (2010). 
48 See the Honorable the Chief Justice of Singapore, S. Menon, Keynote Address, Some Cautionary Notes for an Age 
of Opportunity,delivered at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators International Arbitration Conference in Penang, 
Malaysia on 22 August 2013, paras. 8-14; text available at: 
http://singaporeinternationalarbitration.com/2013/08/28/chief-justice-menon-keynote-address-to-ciarb-





ICSID Convention.49Since its experience in the White Industries v India arbitration (in which India 
was found liable to an Australian investor on the basis of its judicial delays under an “effective 
means” investment-treaty clause) and other investor arbitration claims, India has begun to 
review its bilateral investment treaties, and is possibly launching a new model BIT in due 
course. 50 Even a developed country such as Australia has decided to adopt a ‘case-by-case’ 
approach to whether to include investor-State dispute settlement in their FTAs,51 and the current 
negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement(TTIP) 
between the US and EU have met with concerns over investor-State dispute settlement issues.52 
 
VI. Information-sharing, Legal Education and Capacity Building 
 
With the explosion of intra-ASEAN and external-partner treaty activity, it is essential to ensure 
adequate development of legal knowledge,and dispute prevention and handling expertise in 
ASEAN. Dispute handling refers not only to dealing with litigation or arbitration claims, but 
also dispute avoidance as well as dispute management (such as dealing with early signs of 
conflict and handling media and other publicity). At the same time, it is important to ensure 
adequate regular updating of legal knowledge in the region’s relevant institutions. 
 
At the obligations-formation stage of treaty negotiations, familiarity with international 
developments in investor-State decisions, academic debates and treaty negotiation techniques are 
critical to ensure that treaty-making and implementation are undertaken with the best 
information and ideas on hand.This calls for systematic, ongoing dissemination of information 
and legal updates on trade and investment laws and disputesfor lawyers, treaty negotiators, 
economic-portfolio diplomats, judicial officers and relevant government agencies within all 
ASEAN member states. At the university level, law students of ASEAN should be exposed to 
and adequately trained in international economic law and dispute settlement mechanisms, to 





As ASEAN continues to participate in a number of trade negotiations - such as those of 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, between ASEAN and China, India, 
                                                          
49 See UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf and Venezuela-ICSID: Leaving is Easier Said 
than Done, 17 January 2012, Financial Times, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/01/17/venezuela-icsid-
leaving-is-easier-said-than-done/. 
50 White Industries Ltd v Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30 November 2011).  As for India’s actions, 
see note 37 above. See also generally, Hsu, Asian Treaty Makers and Investment Arbitration: Negotiating with a Wary 
Eye, (2012) Contemp. Asia Arb. J. 5:2, 243-263. 
51 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade information, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/isds-faq.html, as at 13 
January 2015. Australia is facing international investor arbitrations as well as WTO complaints after introducing 
its ‘plain packing’ laws for tobacco products; see 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Pages/Tobaccoplainpackaging.aspx.  
52 See EU website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179.  
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Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand), ASEAN and Hong Kong, and through a few 
ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) for a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) – it must draw on lessons from earlier negotiations and disputes 
encountered. 
 
In addition, having undertaken a number of significant treaty obligations, both in the intra-
ASEAN context as well as with external partners, ASEAN law-makers and regulators need to be 
mindful of these when amending or introducing new laws, regulations and policies which may 
fall for scrutiny under ASEAN’s various economic treaties. 
 
As the AEC moves closer to becoming a reality and ASEAN continues to adopt a rules-based 
approach in its economic relations, legal obligations and their implementation will play an 
increasingly important role in further shaping the Community. Judges, law-makers and lawyers 
will therefore have a continuing part to play in this dynamic process of forging the new 
economic “face” of ASEAN. In the area of trade and investment dispute settlement ASEAN 
policy-makers will need to consider, on an ongoing basis, what valuable lessons may be drawn 
from disputes – both pending and settled – before the WTO as well as investment arbitration 
tribunals. 
 
A related consideration is ASEAN’s approach to handling economic treaty negotiations and 
disputes among its members, particularly in light of itsaspirations to develop a common stance in 
various matters expressed in the Bali Concord III.53 
 
                                                          
53 Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations, adopted 17 November 2011; text 
available at: www.asean.org/archive/documents/.../Bali%20Concord%20III.pdf. See for example, under 
“Economic Cooperation”, Art. B.2(e), in which ASEAN has resolved to “[i]ntensify collaboration to adopt [sic] 
common position on issues of mutual interest in regional and international fora”. 
